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Abstract: This paper investigates the intraday effects of unannounced foreign 
exchange intervention on bid-ask exchange rate spreads using official intraday 
intervention data provided by the Danish central bank. Our starting point is a simple 
theoretical model of the bid-ask spread which we use to formulate testable hypotheses 
regarding how unannounced intervention purchases and intervention sales influence the 
market asymmetrically. To test these hypotheses we estimate weighted least squares 
(WLS) time-series models of the intraday bid-ask spread. Our main result is that 
intervention purchases and sales both exert a significant influence on the exchange rate 
spread, but in opposite directions: intervention purchases of the smaller currency, on 
average, reduce the spread while intervention sales, on average, increase the spread. We 
also show that intervention only affects the exchange rate spread when the state of the 
market is not abnormally volatile. Our results are consistent with the notion that 
illiquidity arises when traders fear speculative pressure against the smaller currency and 
confirms the asymmetry hypothesis of our theoretical model. 
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1. Introduction 
The majority of the vast literature on foreign exchange intervention investigates whether 
intervention influences the exchange rate market with little attention paid to explaining 
why intervention might be influential. Exceptions include two categories of studies, the 
first of which focuses on the traditional transmission channels, such as the portfolio 
balance and the signaling channel, for understanding how intervention works.
1
 The 
second category of studies, to which this paper seeks to contribute, goes beyond the 
traditional transmission channels and offers microstructure based analyses of the 
interaction between intervention and exchange rates.
2
 
The context of this paper is that of unannounced intervention aimed at 
maintaining a smaller currency pegged to a major currency. Our starting point is a simple 
theoretical model of the bid-ask exchange rate spread which we use to formulate testable 
hypotheses regarding how intervention may influence market perceptions of whether a 
currency is properly priced. In the model, foreign exchange dealers quickly pass on a 
central bank trade to their customers, and the bid-ask spread is determined by the slope of 
the aggregate customer demand curve. This slope, in turn, is directly related to customer 
uncertainty about market fundamentals. Within this modeling framework, a wider spread 
arises when the central bank’s intervention induces customer uncertainty. This is the case 
following an intervention purchase of the major currency on normal days, i.e. days 
                                               
1 See Kumhof (2010) and Fatum (2010) for recent studies that focus on traditional transmission channels of 
intervention. See Humpage (2003) and Neely (2005) for broad surveys of the intervention literature. 
2 Microstructure based contributions include Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), Dominguez (2003), and 
Chari (2007). The first study analyses the effects of intervention on exchange rate spreads using official 
daily intervention data, the two more recent studies use time-stamped newswire reports of intervention to 
analyze the effects of intervention on the first two moments of the exchange rate and the exchange rate 
spread, respectively. See Fischer (2006) for a discussion of the accuracy of newswire reports, and 
Hasbrouck (2007) for a survey of the large literature on the bid-ask spread in financial markets in general. 
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without abnormal exchange rate volatility, because the customers are unable to 
distinguish such an intervention trade from speculative pressure on the fixed exchange 
rate mechanism. By contrast, an intervention purchase of the smaller currency is unlikely 
to be interpreted by the customers as an indication of speculative pressure against the 
major currency. This fundamental asymmetry translates into the testable hypothesis that 
intervention sales of the smaller currency leads to an increase in the bid-ask spread while 
intervention purchases of the smaller currency do not. Interestingly, the prediction of our 
theory differs from the signaling channel hypothesis which suggests that a central bank 
intervention is influential only if it reduces uncertainty about fundamentals. 
To test the predictions of our theoretical framework we employ proprietary data 
on official intraday intervention transactions in the Danish Krone-Euro (DKK/EUR) 
market provided by the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank (DN), along with 
indicative 5-minute spot bid and ask DKK/EUR prices.
3
 Our data covers the 1 August 
2002 to 31 December 2004 time-period and a total of 162 intervention transactions. 
Importantly, all DN interventions are unannounced and, furthermore, rarely reported in 
the newswire services.
4
 
We estimate time-series models of the DKK/EUR bid-ask spread with 
intervention purchases and sales entering as separate explanatory variables. Our baseline 
                                               
3 The DN interventions are carried out under the provisions of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). 
Denmark has participated in ERM II since 1 January 1999. In ERM II, a bilateral central rate and a 
deviation band is set for the currency of the participating country vis-à-vis the EUR, but not against the 
currency of the other member states. The official DKK/EUR central rate is 7.46038 DKK/EUR and the 
official deviation band is set to +/- 2.25 percent. The DKK has traded within an even narrower range of +/- 
0.50 percent around the Danish ERM II central rate. For additional details on the institutional aspects of 
ERM II and DN intervention see Fatum and Pedersen (2009). 
4 A comprehensive Factiva search for both English and Danish language newswire reports of DN 
interventions, using various search word combinations such as “Danish intervention”, “Danmarks 
Nationalbank”, and “Danish Crown” etc., found only four intervention reports in total (three English 
language reports from Reuters News and one Danish language report from a Danish daily newspaper), none 
of which mentions neither amount nor timing of the reported interventions. 
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estimations use the weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998). As a methodological robustness test we also estimate OLS models 
with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and 
covariances. Our study is the first to investigate the intraday effects of unannounced 
intervention on exchange rate spreads using accurate official intervention transactions 
data.
5
 
Our results show that both intervention purchases and sales significantly influence 
the exchange rate spread, but the effects are asymmetric: Intervention purchases of the 
smaller currency, on average, reduce the spread while intervention purchases of the large 
currency, on average, increase the spread. This key result holds up against an array of 
robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity, coincidental arrival of macro 
news, testing for break-points, and allowing for the possibility of delayed as well as lead 
effects. We also show that the significant and asymmetric effects of intervention 
purchases and sales are state dependent in the sense that interventions carried out on 
“normal” days in terms of exchange rate volatility are influential while interventions have 
no effect on the bid-ask spread when the market is abnormally volatile. 
These empirical findings are consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis of our 
theoretical model and give credibility to the theoretical interpretation that the uncertainty 
of the market regarding the exchange rate decreases when interventions are carried out to 
strengthen the smaller currency, while the uncertainty of the market increases when 
                                               
5 The Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and now DN are the only central banks that have made 
intraday intervention data available for research. Only the Swiss National Bank makes their intraday 
intervention data instantly publicly available. See Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Pasquariello (2007) for 
analyses of the intraday effects of the announced Swiss interventions on the exchange rate level and 
exchange rate spread, respectively. See Fatum and King (2005) for a study of the intraday exchange rate 
level and volatility effects of Canadian interventions. 
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interventions indicate that the smaller currency is overvalued. Moreover, our results 
illustrate the importance of distinguishing between intervention purchases and 
intervention sales when assessing the influence of intervention on exchange rate spreads 
in the context of intervention aimed at maintaining a smaller currency in a narrow band 
around a major currency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical 
model of the bid-ask spread. Sections 3 and 4 detail the data and the econometric 
methodology, respectively. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents several 
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
The central bank’s intervention is carried out in the dealer market. Our theory starts from 
the observation that as direct counterparties to the central bank’s intervention trade, 
dealers are eager to off-load this deviation from an optimal currency position to their 
customer traders.
6
 The price impact as well as the ensuing currency market illiquidity is 
therefore determined by the properties of the customers’ aggregate short-run demand 
curve.  
Although focusing on customers rather than dealers, our theory of liquidity is 
closely related to the inventory theory of the bid ask spread, see Stoll (1978) and Ho and 
Stoll (1981). In our version, customers require a liquidity premium for deviating from 
their ideal position. Basing our theory on this component of the bid-ask spread, we do not 
explicitly take into account the pure transactions costs and adverse selection costs often 
                                               
6 Individual dealers generally eliminate inventory positions quickly. In the first instance dealers may share 
positions in the interdealer market, but there is pressure on all dealers to off-load positions before the end of 
the day. See Osler (2008) for a discussion. 
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investigated by the financial market microstructure literature. This is because, first, the 
transactions cost component is unlikely to capture any spread asymmetry, as transactions 
in both directions tend to be equally costly. Second, the theory of adverse selection due to 
counterparty information is well captured by our later assumption that the bid-ask spread 
widens when customer uncertainty increases.
7
  
Given that the uncertainty on behalf of currency market traders determines the 
market’s degree of liquidity, the central question becomes how central bank interventions 
affect this uncertainty. The central bank follows a policy of opacity, and hence does not 
announce its intervention. It is therefore reasonable to assume that as the intervention 
occurs, the customers observe only a large order flow, but they cannot discern the origin 
of the order flow.  
The key assumptions of our model are that customer uncertainty in the market is 
related to the possibility that the exchange rate regime is subject to speculative pressure 
and that the customers in the market interpret and react to the intervention order flow as 
follows. If speculative pressure is based on the premise that the smaller currency is 
overvalued in the peg, the natural conduct of the speculators is to sell the smaller 
currency and purchase the large currency. As a result, when market conditions indicate a 
large sale of the smaller currency, customers become more uncertain about fundamentals, 
and the spread widens. By contrast, if the large currency is considered overvalued, there 
are plenty of currencies other than this particular smaller currency against which pressure 
on the large currency can be levied. A large sale of the large currency against the smaller 
currency, therefore, should not lead to a particular run for the smaller currency. Instead, a 
                                               
7 Empirical evidence suggests that bid-ask spreads widen when uncertainty increases. See, for example, 
Bollerslev and Melvin (1994). 
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large sale of the large currency against the smaller currency can be interpreted as a sign 
that the peg is credible, thereby reducing uncertainty and narrowing the spread. 
We also assume that the marginal effect of the central bank’s intervention on the 
customer uncertainty is greater in a normal market than when volatility is high, simply 
because, in a volatile market, the central bank’s intervention is less likely to be 
sufficiently remarkable to significantly affect customer uncertainty over fundamentals. 
We will derive these implications in a formal model. After presenting the model, 
we discuss the incentives of the central bank and the dealers not to pass on all their 
information about the true market conditions to the customer market.  
 
2.1 The Model 
We model the short-run aggregate demand curve for the smaller currency from a 
population of many small customers. From the point of view of this customer population, 
the smaller currency is a risky asset. It trades at rate p, but has random value θ over the 
relevant holding period. We assume that the customers hold the common belief that θ is 
normally distributed with variance σ2>0. 
There is a continuum of competitive customers, maximizing expected utility of 
end-of-period wealth. The utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) and, following Wilson (1968), there exists a representative customer with 
CARA utility as a function of aggregate customer wealth, U(w)=–exp(-ρw), with risk 
aversion parameter ρ>0. 
It is well known that the CARA utility function with normally distributed asset 
returns gives rise to the following simple asset demand function: 
 8 
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where x denotes the quantity demanded, E(θ) and V(θ)=σ2 are the customer market’s 
representative expectation and variance for the random variable θ, respectively. 
Essentially, customers are willing to purchase the asset when it trades at a price below 
expected value, and they are willing to take larger positions for a given expected gain the 
smaller is σ2. Thus, the aversion to risk reduces the slope of the demand curve. 
The main assumptions of our analysis are the following. First, if there is an 
unusually large sale of the small currency asset, then the customer uncertainty parameter 
σ2 rises. Second, if there is an unusually large purchase of the asset, the customer 
uncertainty falls. Third, in a more volatile market, a central bank intervention is less 
likely to be remarkable, and hence has less impact on customer uncertainty. 
Proposition 1  The spread is directly proportional to the customer 
uncertainty parameter σ2. The first assumption implies that the spread increases when the 
central bank intervenes with a sale of the smaller currency. The second assumption 
implies that the spread falls when the central bank purchases the smaller currency. The 
third assumption implies that both effects are smaller in a more volatile market. 
Proof  Suppose that the central bank intervenes with the net trade z 
while other exogenous market net trades of amount u arrive at the market. Short-run 
market clearing implies that x(p)=z+u. The resulting short-run equilibrium rate becomes 
p=E(θ)–ρσ2(z+u). As is common in the literature on market microstructure, at least since 
Kyle (1985), we can interpret dp/du=ρσ2 as a natural measure of market illiquidity. The 
round-trade spread, defined as the cost of first buying then selling one unit, becomes 
 9 
2ρσ2. The three results follow from translating each assumption about σ2 into implications 
for the spread.    □ 
The proof reveals that the spread is also proportional to the risk aversion 
parameter ρ. This deep preference parameter is unlikely to be affected by the direction of 
the central bank’s intervention. The central bank's intervention is not announced to the 
entire market. This suggests that the central bank is hoping to obtain a larger immediate 
price impact in the market through secrecy than through an openly announced 
intervention.
8
 To the extent that this lack of openness is responsible for the widening bid-
ask spread following a sale of the smaller currency, the central bank is willing to obtain a 
greater price impact at the cost of greater illiquidity.
9
 
Similarly, we assume that dealers do not pass on information about interventions 
to the customers. A committed strategy of concealment may help dealers to continue 
profitable market operations in the event of speculative pressure. Moreover, it seems 
natural that speculators want to secretly build up positions against the currency with 
minimal price impact before revealing any intentions to speculate against the currency. 
 
3. Data 
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR market over the 1 
August 2002 to 31 December 2004 period.
10
 The data includes the exact amount and 
time-stamp to the nearest minute obtained directly from the trade-sheet of each 
                                               
8 Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) discuss advantages of secret interventions. 
9 Similar concerns affect other market manipulators such as investment banks seeking to stabilize IPO 
after-market prices, or firms trading in their own stock. 
10 The sample period is determined by data availability and coincides with the period studied by Fatum and 
Pedersen (2009) in which they show that DN intervention is, on average, effective in influencing the level 
of the DKK/EUR exchange rate. 
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intervention transaction. Intervention amounts are quoted in EUR and a positive amount 
denotes a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK.
11
  
Table 1A displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data. Our sample 
consists of a total of 73 intervention days, encompassing a total of 162 intervention 
transactions. On intervention days, the average daily intervention amount is EUR 155 
million, which is roughly 5.5% of the average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market.
12
 
The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by Olsen and 
Associates. The data consists of the bid and the offer spot exchange rate at the end of 
every 5-minute interval over every 24-hour period. The quotes are indicative quotes, i.e. 
not necessarily traded quotes. We follow Dacorogna, Müller, Nagler, Olsen and Pictet 
(1993) and filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.
13
 
There is very virtually no trading of the Danish currency outside of standard 
Danish business hours (see DN 2003 and ECB 2004), thus we define a trading day in the 
Danish currency market to start at 8.00 GMT+1 and finish at 17.00 GMT+1.
14
 
Consequently, our analysis considers a total of 603 trading days consisting of a total of 
                                               
11 In accordance with the ERM II provisions, the DN trader conducting an intervention operation is 
required to write the amount and the exact time of the operation on the trade-sheet immediately after the 
completion of each individual intervention transaction. This information is forwarded to the ECB by the 
end of the trading day, at the latest. Our intraday intervention data consists of this extremely reliable 
information. 
12 Average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market was USD 2,236 million in 2004, or roughly EUR 2,800 
million when converted at the prevailing USD/EUR rate of 1.25. See BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of 
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2004, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.htm 
Statistical Annex Table E.6, pp 61, for statistics on average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market. 
13 Transactions bid and ask prices are not available for the DKK/EUR exchange rate market. 
14 This definition of a trading day carries over naturally to a definition of a weekend, i.e. we define a 
weekend to start at 17.05 GMT+1 Friday and finish at 8.00 GMT+1 Monday. 
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64383 5-minute DKK/EUR exchange rate bid-ask spreads.
15
 Importantly, our trading day 
definition encompasses all intervention transactions in the period under study. 
Table 1B summarizes key statistical properties of our 5-minute bid-ask exchange 
rate spreads (defined as ask minus bid). Figure 1 shows the interventions juxtaposed 
against the DKK/EUR exchange rate. 
Danish and Euro-Area interest rates are obtained from the websites of DN 
(www.nationalbanken.dk) and the ECB (www.ecb.int), respectively. Time-stamped 
Danish, German, and Euro-area macro announcements and preceding survey expectations 
are obtained from Bloomberg. Summary statistics regarding interest rates and macro 
news are available from the authors upon request. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
In order to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the response of the 
bid-ask spread series to an intervention we employ the WLS procedure developed by 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).  
First, we model the response of the exchange rate spread, SPt, as a linear function 
of J lagged values of the spread itself, K lags of (the absolute value of) intervention 
purchases (I
P
t), and H lags of (the absolute value of) intervention sales (I
S
t):  
(2)  
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As noted earlier, T=64383. We choose J=6 based on the Schwartz and Akaike 
information criteria and we set K=H=0 in our baseline estimations (we control for 
                                               
15 We also deleted the following fixed holidays from the analysis: 1 January, Easter (three holidays), 
Christmas (24/25/26 December), 31 December as well as four Denmark-specific holidays (Store Bededag, 
Kristi Himmelfartsdag, Anden Pinsedag, and Grundlovsdag).  
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delayed effects in our robustness checks). We estimate the conditional mean expression 
using OLS and obtain the estimated residuals, tˆ .
 16
 Next, we model the volatility pattern 
using the estimated residuals of Equation (2) and the following parameterization: 
(3)
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where the absolute value of tˆ  proxies for the volatility in the 5-minute interval t, M is 
the number of normalizing constants (in our case 3), n is the number of intervals in a day 
(in our case 108), tˆ is the one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that 
contains interval t), V and W are the number of lags of interventions included (V=W=1 
based on the Schwartz and the Akaike criteria), q is a specific intraday calendar effect, Q 
is the total number of calendar effects accounted for (Q=8, based on the Schwartz and the 
Akaike criteria), and tu  denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard normal). 
We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the first term after the vector of 
constants) using the concept of realized volatility (RV), calculated on 30 minute returns.
17
 
Since the RV forecast cannot capture the observed cyclical intraday patterns (the slow 
decay in the autocorrelations), we model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of 
a Fourier flexible form (see Gallant, 1981).
18
 Consistent with Andersen and Bollerslev 
                                               
16 We also include in the conditional mean model as additional explanatory variables the distance from 
parity, i.e. a measure of the distance between the DKK/EUR exchange rate and the central rate, as well as 
the EUR-DKK interest rate differential. Both variables proved insignificant in all estimations and were thus 
excluded from the conditional mean model for the remainder of the analysis. 
17 RV is defined as the daily sum of squared returns and constitutes an unbiased, efficient and 
asymptotically consistent estimate of the true daily quadratic variation. A key advantage of using RV is that 
this semi-parametric approach does not require additional model estimation. 
18 A Fourier flexible form consists of a number of sine- and cosine terms with varying degrees of 
periodicity (the terms in the parenthesis of Equation 3). It allows for a model specification as flexible as 
possible, thereby enabling us to fit the intraday pattern of the residuals from Equation (2). 
 13 
(1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), who include their macro 
news variables in the volatility equation, we include the intervention variable (i.e. our 
main “news” variable) in the volatility model. 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 displays the results of the WLS estimation of the conditional mean model 
(Equation 2). The first column shows the results of a preliminary regression that does not 
distinguish between intervention purchases and sales, i.e. as a preliminary exercise 
Equations 1 and 2 are simplified such that absolute intervention purchases, I
P
t, and 
absolute intervention sales, I
S
t, are replaced by a variable containing (the absolute value 
of) all interventions, It (thus I
P
t + I
S
t =  It). As the table shows, the coefficient estimate 
associated with intervention is insignificant, suggesting that intervention, on average, has 
no intraday influence on the exchange rate spread. 
To allow for the possibility of non-uniform effects on the exchange rate spread 
across intervention purchases and sales, and to test the first two predictions of Proposition 
1, we estimate the baseline model with intervention purchases and sales entering as 
separate variables (as described in Equations 1 and 2). The results, displayed in the 
second column of Table 2, show that contemporaneous intervention purchases as well as 
contemporaneous intervention sales are significant (both at 95%) and do in fact influence 
the exchange rate spread in opposite directions. Consistent with the first two predictions 
of Proposition 1, intervention sales of EUR decrease the exchange rate spread while 
intervention purchases of EUR increase the spread. 
 14 
Certainly, these results make clear the necessity of distinguishing between 
intervention purchases and intervention sales when assessing the influence of intervention 
on exchange rate spreads when intervention is aimed at maintaining a smaller currency in 
a narrow band around a major currency. Moreover, the results provide evidence that 
unannounced interventions of which the foreign exchange market customers cannot know 
the origin and, therefore, observe only as large order flows, significantly affect the 
market’s perception of whether a currency is under- or overvalued, and they do so in an 
asymmetric manner. Intervention aimed at appreciating the smaller currency is 
interpreted by the market to indicate that speculative pressure against this currency is less 
likely, thereby reducing the price risk associated with holding said currency. This reduced 
risk is manifested in the narrowing of the exchange rate spread. By contrast, intervention 
aimed at depreciating the smaller currency is interpreted to indicate that speculative 
pressure against this currency might be increasing and, as a result, the spread widens.
19
 
It is interesting to relate our findings to Fatum and Pedersen (2009). They use the 
same intervention data as ours to show that intervention sales of DKK (the smaller 
currency) significantly influence the level of the exchange rate in the intended direction 
whereas intervention purchases have no detectable level effect. Our results, therefore, are 
perfectly consistent with theirs, suggesting that in the case of unannounced intervention 
sales of the smaller currency it is the fear of speculative pressure and associated increased 
uncertainty regarding whether the currency is properly priced that causes the market to 
                                               
19 Table 3 displays the results of the estimation of the volatility model described in Equation (3). The RV is 
highly significant, as are most of the trigonometric terms, thus suggesting that the model captures the 
intraday periodicity well. Interestingly, all the intervention variables, regardless of whether the model 
specification distinguishes between purchases and sales, and regardless of the direction of the interventions, 
are negative and significant at either 90 or 95%, thereby indicating that regardless of whether intervention 
increases or decreases market uncertainty, the variation of this uncertainty declines. 
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depreciate the currency; by contrast, unannounced intervention purchases of the smaller 
currency are interpreted by traders as a confirmation of the peg, thereby decreasing the 
uncertainty surrounding the currency with no detectable adjustment of the price. 
 
5.1 State Dependence 
In order to test the third and final part of Proposition 1, that the effects of intervention on 
the exchange rate spread are state dependent with respect to the volatility of the foreign 
exchange market, we distinguish between interventions that occur on “high-volatility” 
days and interventions that occur on “normal” days. We define a ”high-volatility” day as 
a day with either a significant intraday volatility jump, i.e. a “jump-day” as defined in 
Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007), or with a daily realized volatility that is at 
least the average realized volatility of the sample plus two times its standard deviation. A 
“normal” day is defined as all other days.  
Table 4 displays the results of re-estimating the conditional mean model 
(Equation 1) with intervention on “high-volatility” days and intervention on “normal” 
days entering as separate variables. As before, we first carry out a preliminary estimation 
that does not distinguish between intervention purchases and sales. The results are 
displayed in the first column of Table 4 and show a complete absence of significant 
effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread regardless of the state of the market. 
The second column of Table 4 shows the results of the conditional mean model 
when distinguishing between “high-volatility” and “normal” days across separate 
intervention purchases and intervention sales variables, i.e. intervention is divided into 
four separate intervention variables (intervention purchases when the market is volatile, 
 16 
intervention purchases when the market is normal, intervention sales when the market is 
volatile, and intervention sales when the market is normal). Consistent with the baseline 
estimations, the results show that intervention purchases of the smaller currency decrease 
the exchange rate spread while intervention sales increase the spread, but only for 
interventions carried out on days when the market conditions are not considered volatile. 
While these results further confirm the necessity of taking into account that 
intervention purchases and sales impact the exchange rate spread in opposite directions, 
they also show that the significant and asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and 
sales are not uniform across intervention days but stem solely from the effects of 
interventions that are carried out on days when the state of the market is normal rather 
than volatile. This is consistent with the third prediction of Proposition 1. 
 
6. Robustness 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the baseline model using a 
different econometric procedure, take into account the possibility that the intervention 
variables contain expected components, control for macro news surprises, include lags 
and leads of the intervention variables, and test for structural breaks to ensure that our 
parameter estimates are stable across the sample period.
20
 
First, the gain in efficiency from the WLS procedure is potentially costly in terms 
of inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial estimation of Equation (2) are 
improperly fitted in the volatility model described by Equation (3). In order to address 
this potential concern we re-estimate the baseline model using heteroskedasticity- and 
                                               
20 Results pertaining to HAC estimations, delayed effects, lead effects, and break point test are not shown 
for brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
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serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors (i.e. we re-estimate Equation 2 using 
HAC errors). The HAC results are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results 
based on the WLS procedure. 
Second, while there is no reason to believe that intervention is triggered by the 
contemporaneous exchange rate spread (i.e. the change in exchange rate spread that 
occurs over the 5-minute interval within which intervention is carried out), intervention is 
nevertheless correlated with recent (lagged) exchange rate movements and with recent 
(lagged) intervention, even at the intraday frequency. Therefore, our intervention 
variables are likely comprised of unexpected as well as expected components. To ensure 
that failure to disentangle the latter from the former does not lead to an underestimation 
of the true impact of intervention on exchange rate spreads, we follow Naranjo and 
Nimalendran (2000) and others by estimating a central bank reaction function to capture 
the expected component of the (in our context) intraday intervention variable. In turn, we 
subtract the expected component of intervention from the actual intervention variables in 
intervals where the latter are non-zero. The resulting series constitute proxies for 
unexpected interventions.
21
 The results of estimating the effects of unexpected 
intervention on exchange rate spreads are displayed in Table 5 (the first column shows 
the results when all interventions are contained in one variable while the second column 
shows the results using separate intervention sales and purchases variables). As the table 
shows, the results are qualitatively identical to the comparable estimation results from 
estimations that do not distinguish between actual intervention and unexpected 
intervention. This is unsurprising considering that the reaction function estimations 
explain only a minor part of the interventions. 
                                               
21 For additional details see Fatum and Pedersen (2009).  
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Third, to ensure that our estimated effects of intervention are not tainted by the 
coincidental arrival of macro news, we extend our analysis to include time-stamped 
Danish, German, and Euro-area macro surprises. This is important because macro 
surprises can change the perception of the market in regards to whether a currency is 
properly aligned with fundamentals, i.e. we need to make sure that what we label the 
reaction of the market to unannounced interventions is not in actuality a matter of the 
market adjusting to macro news. To address this concern we include macro surprises 
regarding Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Current 
Account (DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer Confidence (DKCC); 
German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Production (DEIP); Euro-
Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business Climate Index (EABC).  
Macro surprises are measured as the difference between macro announcement and 
preceding survey expectation. The macro news as well as the intervention variables are 
standardized (i.e. we divide each variable by its sample standard deviation).
 
The results of 
the estimations with macro surprises included, displayed in Table 6, show that a few of 
the macro surprises influence the spread. More importantly, the results regarding the 
asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales remain. 
Fourth, in order to test for delayed effects of intervention, we re-estimate our 
baseline models with 12 lags (60 minutes) of both intervention purchases and 
intervention sales included (i.e. we set K=H=12 in Equation 2). The results show no 
systematic pattern of delayed effects and, moreover, the previously discussed asymmetric 
contemporaneous effects of intervention purchases and sales, respectively, are 
unchanged. 
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Fifth, we address the possibility that the market anticipates and, therefore, reacts 
in advance of the interventions by testing for the presence of lead effects. Specifically, we 
add two (10 minutes) and, subsequently, six leads (30 minutes) of intervention purchases 
and intervention sales to the baseline conditional mean model (Equation 2). None of the 
leads is individually significant and, moreover, the respective sums of leads (two or six 
leads) are not significantly different from zero. 
Sixth, to ensure that our parameter estimates are valid across the entire sample 
period we employ the Andrews (1993) test for unknown break point. The test does not 
detect any evidence of a break point and, therefore, we accept the hypothesis of 
parameter stability across our sample.
22
 
In sum, all our robustness checks confirm that intervention aimed at strengthening 
the smaller currency (i.e. sales of EUR against purchases of DKK) decreases the 
exchange rate spread while intervention aimed at depreciating the smaller currency (i.e. 
purchases of EUR against sales of DKK) increases the spread. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The context of the paper is that of unannounced intervention aimed at maintaining a 
smaller currency pegged to a major currency. Our theoretical framework suggests that 
unannounced interventions of which the foreign exchange market customers cannot know 
the origin and, therefore, observe simply as large order flows, significantly affect the 
market’s perception of whether a currency is under- or overvalued in an asymmetric 
manner. We hypothesize that the traders who determine market liquidity become 
                                               
22 Fatum and Pedersen (2009) also reject the hypothesis of parameter instability over the August 2002 to 
December 2004 period in their study of the intraday exchange rate level effects of DN intervention.  
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uncertain regarding whether the price of the smaller currency is properly aligned with 
fundamentals when the central bank intervenes with an opaque sale of said currency, a 
sale that due to its unknown origin can be falsely attributed to speculative pressure. This 
increased uncertainty is then manifested in an increase in the exchange rate bid-ask 
spread. By contrast, a large purchase of a smaller currency is unlikely to indicate 
speculative pressure against the large currency but might instead be interpreted to 
indicate credibility of the peg of the smaller currency and, as a result, lead to reduced 
uncertainty about the price of the smaller currency vis-à-vis the large currency. This 
reduced uncertainty will then materialize itself in a narrowing of the spread. 
We test the predictions of our theoretical framework on proprietary time-stamped 
intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central bank along with indicative 5-
minute spot bid and ask DKK/EUR exchange rate quotes over the 1 August 2002 to 31 
December 2004 period. The Danish interventions are unannounced and generally not 
reported on the newswire. No previous study has analyzed the intraday effects of 
unannounced interventions on exchange rate spreads using official intraday data. 
Consistent with our hypothesis the results of our time-series estimations show that 
intervention purchases of DKK (the smaller currency) decrease the spread while 
intervention sales of DKK increase the spread. This key result holds up against an array 
of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity, coincidental arrival of macro 
news, testing for break-points, and allowing for the possibility of delayed as well as lead 
effects. We also show that the significant asymmetric effects of intervention purchases 
and sales stem solely from days when the market is normal rather than volatile. This 
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finding confirms our priors regarding the importance of the state of the market and that 
intervention does not affect the bid-ask spread when the market is volatile. 
The existing microstructure based literature on intervention focuses on flexible 
exchange rates of major currencies where an asymmetry arising from traders’ fear of 
speculative pressure building against one currency, and as a result opaque intervention 
sales triggering a different market reaction than opaque intervention purchases, is 
unlikely to be as important as in our context of a smaller currency pegged to a major 
currency. It is, therefore, difficult to compare our findings to other studies. Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that our results show that the intraday effects of intervention on spreads 
are asymmetric, thereby contrasting the results of studies by Chari (2007) and Naranjo 
and Nimalendran (2000) that, in the context of intervention in the JPY/USD and the 
DEM/USD markets, respectively, show that intervention, on average, increases the 
spread. Our finding that the influence of interventions is state dependent is, however, 
consistent with the results of Dominguez (2003). 
In conclusion, our study illustrates the market power of central banks and their 
ability to influence foreign exchange trader’s perception of uncertainty in regards to 
whether a currency is priced correctly or not. Ironically, this ability seems contingent on 
traders being unaware that what they are influenced by is in fact the action of the central 
bank rather than a privately initiated trade. As such, our study, therefore, provides some 
rationale for carrying out opaque rather than announced interventions. Finally, our study 
shows that a necessary condition for central bank interventions to influence the exchange 
rate spread is that the market is not abnormally volatile, thereby illustrating that the 
market power of central banks is also contingent on the state of the market. 
 22 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Notes: 
a) Data Source: Danmarks Nationalbank (interventions) and Olsen and Associates 
(exchange rates). 
b) A positive intervention is a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK; a negative 
intervention is a sales of EUR against a purchase of DKK.  
c) The upper and lower lines are the ERM II deviation bands. Interventions are plotted 
against the central parity exchange rate of 7.46038. 
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TABLE 1A                                    Intervention Summary Statistics 
 
Number of 
Interventions 
Average amount 
(mill. EUR) 
Daily interventions 
All 73 155 
Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 52 144 
Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 21 182 
Intraday interventions 
All 162 70 
Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 99 76 
Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 63 61 
 
NOTES: 
Data source: Danmarks Nationalbank 
Sample period: 1 August 2002 to 31 December 2004 
 
 
TABLE 1B   Summary Statistics for 5 Minute DKK/EUR Exchange Rate Spreads 
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
0.021 
(~0.001) 
0.0342 
(-) 
2.7586 
(0.0097) 
10.4709** 
(0.0193) 
Minimum Maximum 
BJ-test for 
normality LB Q-test (5-day lag) 
0 
 
0.3420 
 
 
231372*** 
 [5.9915] 
138172*** 
[3.8415] 
 
NOTES:   
Data source: Olsen and Associates 
Sample period: 1 August 2002 to 31 December 2004 
The data consists of 64383 observations of DKK/EUR exchange rate bid- and ask 
prices 
The exchange rate spreads are calculated as ask minus bid prices  
* Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; critical values in [ ] 
 
 26 
 
TABLE 2          Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention: 
                          Conditional Mean Equation 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention Purchases 
and Sales 
Constant (e-5) 
 
)0(    0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
 0.002***
 
 (0.0001) 
Interventions (e-5) 
 
ALL)0(  
0.8065 
(1.2776) 
- 
Intervention Sales of  EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(S  
- -2.5852** 
 (1.2166) 
Intervention Purchases of  EUR/Sales of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(P  
- 4.3464**  
(2.1773) 
Lags of FX-spreads 
 
)1(  0.33*** 
 (0.0079) 
0.34*** 
 (0.0087) 
)2(  0.19*** 
 (0.0072) 
0.20*** 
 (0.0082) 
)3(  0.12*** 
 (0.0070) 
0.12*** 
 (0.0080) 
)4(  0.10*** 
 (0.0067) 
0.09*** 
 (0.0076) 
)5(  0.07*** 
 (0.0067) 
0.06*** 
 (0.0075) 
)6(  0.08*** 
(0.0063) 
0.08*** 
(0.007) 
 
#Interventions 
 
162 
 
162 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable Name 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equation (2) in the text, and carried out using 
WLS 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread  
(e)    The independent variables are current intervention, and lags of the 
dependent variable 
(f)     R
2
 is not applicable to the two-stage WLS estimation procedure.  
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TABLE 3                                     Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention:  
                                                     Volatility Equation 
 All Interventions 
Separate Intervention Purchases 
and Sales 
Constants 
 
Constant 
0.1834*** 
(0.0677) 
0.1835*** 
(0.0677) 
Normalising constant I 
-0.1310** 
(0.0510) 
-0.1311** 
(0.0510) 
Normalising constant II 
0.0156** 
(0.0062) 
0.0156** 
(0.0062) 
Interday Volatility 
 
Realized Volatility 
57.2750*** 
(0.9005) 
57.2781*** 
(0.9004) 
Sine Terms (e-3) 
 
)1(  0.0028 
(0.0022) 
0.0028 
(0.0022) 
)2(  0.0017** 
(0.0009) 
0.0017** 
(0.0009) 
)3(  0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
)4(  0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
)5(  0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
)6(  0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
Cosine Terms (e-3) 
 
)1(  -0.0081*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0081*** 
(0.0029) 
)2(  -0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
)3(  -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
)4(  -0.0000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0000 
(0.0002) 
)5(  0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
)6(  0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
Excess Volatility Dummies 
 
1 
0.0029** 
(0.0014) 
0.0029** 
(0.0014) 
2 
0.0051*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0051*** 
(0.0010) 
3 
0.0032*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0010) 
Intervention (e-4) 
 
)0(  -0.3951** 
(0.1489) 
- 
 
Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-4) 
 
)0(S  - 
-0.2361* 
(0.1697) 
Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK (e-4) 
 
)0(P  - 
-0.7185** 
(0.2308) 
2R  0.1340 0.1339 
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NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates;  lags in ( ) in Variable Names 
(c)     Estimations are defined in Equation (3) in the text 
(c)    The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression of Equation (2) 
(d)    The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatility measure, trigonometric terms, 
excess volatility dummies, current and lagged intervention sales of EUR (denoted by subscript S), current and 
lagged intervention purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript P), or current and lagged interventions (no 
subscript). 
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TABLE 4                     Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention:  
                                     State Dependence 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention 
Purchases and Sales 
Interventions All on “High-Volatility” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(J  
-0.28 
(4.2352) - 
Interventions All on “Normal” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(NJ  
2.83 
(1.9257) - 
Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK on “High-Volatility” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(SJ  - 
0.52 
(0.8217) 
Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK on “Normal” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(SNJ  - 
-3.17*** 
(1.0660) 
Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK on “High-Volatility” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(PJ  - 
-1.22 
(5.4948) 
Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK on “Normal” Days (e-5) 
 
)0(PNJ  - 
7.77*** 
(2.6954) 
R
2
 0.60 0.60 
#Interventions on “High-
Volatility” Days 
62 
 
- 
#Interventions on “Normal” 
Days 
100 - 
#Intervention Sales of EUR on 
“High-Volatility” Days 
- 19 
#Intervention Sales of EUR on 
“Normal” Days 
- 44 
#Intervention Purchases of EUR 
on “High-Volatility” Days 
- 30 
#Intervention Purchases of EUR 
on “Normal” Days 
- 69 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates 
(c)    Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread  
(e)    Column 1: The independent variables are current intervention on “high-
volatility” days (denoted by subscript J), current intervention on “normal” days 
(denoted by subscript NJ), and lags of the dependent variable. Column 2: The 
independent variables are current intervention sales of EUR on “high-volatility” 
days (denoted by subscript SJ), current intervention sales of EUR on “normal” 
volatility days (denoted by subscript SNJ), current intervention purchases of EUR 
on “high-volatility” days (denoted by subscript PJ), current intervention purchases 
of EUR on “normal” days (denoted by subscript PNJ), and lags of the dependent 
variable 
 (f)    A “high-volatility day” is defined as a day with either a significant intraday 
volatility jump, i.e. a “jump-day” as defined in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold 
(2007), or with a daily realized volatility that is at least the average realized 
volatility of the sample plus two times the standard deviation of the realized 
volatility of the sample; a “normal” day is defined as all other intervention days 
(g)    The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the 
dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition 
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TABLE 5    Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Unexpected Intervention 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention 
Purchases and Sales 
 
Constant (e-5) 
)0(   0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Unexpected Interventions (e-5) 
)0(U  
1.94 
 (1.7594) 
- 
Unexpected Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(US  
- -2.36** 
(1.0806) 
Unexpected Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK  (e-5) 
 
)0(UP  
- 4.99* 
(2.6572) 
R
2
 0.60 0.60 
#Interventions 162 - 
#Intervention Sales 
of EUR 
- 63 
#Interventions 
Purchases of EUR 
- 99 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** 
denotes significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates 
(c)    Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread 
(e)    Column 1: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected 
intervention (denoted by subscript U) and lags of the dependent variable. 
Column 2: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected 
intervention sales of EUR (denoted by subscript US), current intervention 
purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript UP), and lags of the dependent 
variable 
 (f)     Unexpected intervention is proxied by the residual of an intervention 
reaction function estimation 
(g)     The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the 
dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition 
 
 
 31 
 
TABLE 6                  Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention  
                                  and Macro News 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention 
Purchases and Sales 
Standardized Intervention All 
 
)0(SDALL  
0.0017 
(0.0016) - 
Standardized Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 
 
)0(SDS  - 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
Standardized Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 
 
)0(SDP  - 
0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
Standardized Danish Macro News 
 
DKUNEMP(0) 0.0108* 
(0.0060) 
0.0108 
(0.0060) 
DKUNEMP(1) 0.00102* 
(0.0044) 
0.0102** 
(0.0044) 
DKTB(0) 0.0045 
(0.0041) 
0.0045 
(0.0041) 
DKTB(1) -0.0035** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0035 
(0.0021) 
DKCA(0) -0.0112*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0112*** 
(0.0035) 
DKCA(1) -0.0044 
(0.0043) 
-0.0044 
(0.0043) 
DKCPI(0) 0.0138 
(0.0150) 
0.0138 
(0.0150) 
DKCPI(1)  -0.0048 
(0.0078) 
-0.0048 
(0.0078) 
DKGDP(0) -0.0085 
(0.0099) 
-0.0085 
(0.0099) 
DKGDP(1) -0.0274*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.0054) 
DKCC(0) 0.0120*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0120** 
(0.0049) 
DKCC(1) -0.0065** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0029) 
Standardized German Macro News 
 
DEIFO(0) -0.0101*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0038) 
DEIFO(1) 0.0018 
(0.0045) 
0.0018 
(0.0045) 
DEGDP(0) -0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
DEGDP(1) -0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
DEIP(0) 0.0035 
(0.0033) 
0.0035 
(0.0033) 
DEIP(1) 0.0070 
(0.0075) 
0.0070 
(0.0075) 
Standardized Euro-Area Macro News 
 
EACPI(0) -0.0053 
(0.0058) 
-0.0053 
(0.0058) 
EACPI(1) 0.0044 
(0.0033) 
0.0044 
(0.0033) 
EAIP(0) 0.0029 
(0.0031) 
0.0029 
(0.0031) 
EAIP(1) -0.0023 
(0.0023) 
-0.0023 
(0.0023) 
EABC(0) -0.0355 -0.0355 
 32 
(0.0242) (0.0243) 
EABC(1) 0.0134 
 (0.0098) 
0.0134 
(0.0098) 
R
2
 0.60 0.60 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable 
Names 
(c)     Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread.  
(e)    The independent variables are contemporaneous standardized intervention 
sales of EUR (denoted by subscript SDS), contemporaneous standardized 
intervention purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript SDP), contemporaneous 
and lagged standardized macro news, and  lags of the dependent variable 
(f)     Macro news variables capture news surprises as the difference between 
actual announcement and survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The 
estimations take into account news regarding Danish Unemployment 
(DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Current Account (DKCA), CPI 
(DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP), and Consumer Confidence (DKCC); German IFO 
Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Production (DEIP); Euro-Area 
CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business Climate Index 
(EABC). 
(g     All variable s are standardized by dividing each variable by its respective 
sample standard deviation 
(h)   The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the 
dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition 
 
 
